Arusha Peace Agreement Rwanda Pdf

The agreement also worried many soldiers who feared a general demobilization following the military merger provided for in the agreement. This goes a long way in explaining the genocide that followed the following year. [7] The Arusha negotiations were made more difficult by divisions between political parties within the Rwandan government delegation. This is apparent from the various reports of the American observers (document 8) and the reports of the Rwandan delegation referred to President Habyarimana in Kigali (document 14). The most important disagreements were: how the military would be integrated, what would be the size of the overall force, and what would be the shares of the RPF and the former government forces that would constitute the new Rwandan armed forces (document 9). The RPF and the Rwandan government also disagreed on how to vote, on which soldiers and officers to demobilize, how to successfully reintegrate them into society, and on the security issues related to the demobilization process (document 7). October 17, 1990 – Summits begin to peacefully resolve the conflict The talks were conceived as power-sharing negotiations between the rebels and the Rwandan government and resulted in an agreement that favored the Rwandan Patriotic Front due to disagreements within the government. The government delegation was led by opposition Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira (MDR) until President Habyarimana replaced him with Defence Minister James Gasana (MRND) in January 1993. [5] The Arusha Agreement removed many powers from the post of president and transferred them to the transitional government.

In a speech delivered on 15 November 27, 1992, Habyarimana described the Arusha Accords as “pieces of paper” and mocked his opponents who had avoided elections. After AndrĂ© Guichaoua. This did not reflect opposition to the peace agreements as such: in May 1992, Robert Flaten, then U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, wrote to Washington about the talks and strategies for peace negotiations between the Rwandan government and the RPF. The RPF demands that the United States be present at the negotiations “because of doubts about the neutrality of the French”. The United States only agreed to participate if all parties, including the French, were “ready for U.S. participation.” U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson answers a question from the State Department to explain why Rwanda should be endowed with Economic Support Funds (ESF) and why support for the demobilization program is important. Rawson writes: “On both sides of this conflict, there is a total consensus on the need for demobilization, the importance of demobilization to the peace process, and the usefulness of demobilization as an instrument in a reconstruction process.



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